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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
BRUBAKER CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
Plaintiff/Appellee Brubaker Construction, Inc. respectfully 
submits the following brief on appeal: 
I. JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
§78-2-2(3)j and §78-2a-3(k) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
Issue 1: Did Plaintiff/Appellee Brubaker Construction, Inc. 
("Brubaker") waive contractual provisions requiring 
Defendant/Appellant Darrel Jex ("Jex") to verify that electrical 
and plumbing lines had been properly tied or capped off? 
Jex argues that this issue is merely a legal question and 
therefore, this Court should give no deference to the conclusions 
of the trial court. However, Jex is actually challenging the 
trial court's findings of fact as to the meaning and effect of 
Brubakerfs superintendent's statement that "everything was taken 
care of". Therefore, to "mount a successful attack upon the 
correctness of a trial couxt's findings of fact, an appellant 
must first marshal all tho evidence in support of the finding and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & 
Gas Co. . 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be give the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses. Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. 
52(a). 
Issue 2: Was Brubaker estopped from claiming damages against 
Jex based on Jex's reliance on Brubaker's statement that the 
electrical and plumbing lines had been tied off? 
Again, Jex argues that Issue 2 is purely a legal question. 
However, Jex is challenging the trial court's findings of fact as 
to the meaning and effect of Brubaker's superintendent's 
statements. Therefore, to "mount a successful attack upon the 
correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & 
Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be give the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses. Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. 
52(a). 
Issue 3: Did the trial court err in awarding Brubaker delay 
damages? 
Once again, Jex argues Issue 3 is a legal question only. 
However, Jex is challenging the trial court's findings of fact 
that Jex was the cause of delay. Therefore, to "mount a 
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successful attack upon the correctness of a trial court's 
findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below," Willard 
Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) 
(citations omitted). 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be give the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses. Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. 
52(a). 
Issue 4: Did the trial court err in determining that 
Brubaker had not waived delay damages by its course of dealing 
with Jex? 
Jex is arguing the trial court's factual findings of delay 
damages. Therefore, to "mount a successful attack upon the 
correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & 
Gas Co.. 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be give the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
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the credibility of the witnesses. Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. 
52(a). 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or 
statutes applicable to this matter. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case: 
Jex was the successful bidder on a subcontract for 
demolition after having had access to and having reviewed the 
plans and specifications for the project which involved 
demolition and construction of the Central Middle School in 
Ogden, Utah. (Findings of Fact No.l). 
Jex and Brubaker entered into a formal contract on June 4, 
1993 (Findings of Fact No.2). The contract required the work to 
be commenced by June 9, 1993 and completed by July 1, 1993. For 
successful completion, Jex was to be paid $58,000. (Findings of 
Fact No. 3). 
Due to the discovery of asbestos in the building, Jex did 
not begin demolition until June 19, 1996. (Trial Transcript 
p.67, lines 1-55). However, Jex never made any request to 
Brubaker Construction to extend the time of completion due to the 
later starting date. (Trial Transcript p.67, lines 6-14). 
Jex began demolition on the building without personally 
verifying that plumbing and electrical systems had been 
disconnected. (Trial Transcript, p.67, lines 15-25). The plans 
and specifications required Jex to verify that all work to be 
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removed, electrical had been completely shut off and any piping, 
conduit, et cetera, be tied off or capped of. (Conclusions of 
Law No.1). 
Jex failed to complete the contract until late August of 
1993, almost 60 days past the July 1, 1993 deadline (Findings of 
Fact No. 4 and 7). The trial court found that the delays were 
the result of needed repairs to damaged electrical wires in a 
junction box in the demolished building, damaged conduit pipe and 
racks, which were not properly "removed, capped or tied off" 
pursuant to section 02200 of the plans and specifications. 
(Findings of Fact No.4). In addition, other structural damage 
occurred which Jex acknowledged having caused, and Jex' refusal 
to saw-cut certain concrete extension walls added to the delay. 
(Findings of Fact No. 5). 
B. Course of proceedings: 
Brubaker brought this action against Jex claiming damages in 
an amount to be proven at trial but not less than $55,500.00 for 
delay damages and costs to repair structural damages suffered by 
Brubaker as a consequence of Jex's breaches of a contract to 
perform demolition in connection with the remodeling of the 
Central Middle School in Ogden, Utah. Jex brought a counterclaim 
against Brubaker for amounts allegedly due Jex under the contract 
between the parties in the amount of $18,840.00. Jex further 
filed a Third-Party Complaint against CNA Surety Claims, 
Brubakerfs payment bond surety. However, the Third-Party 
Complaint was never served on CNA. 
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C. Disposition at trial court: 
This matter was tried to the Court, sitting without a jury, 
on October 24, 1995. The Court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment on November 27, 1995 and granted 
judgment in favor of Brubaker in the amount of $88,950,00, 
together with attorney's fees and interest. 
VI.SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue 1. Jex argues that Brubaker waived contractual 
provisions requiring Jex to verify that the electrical and 
plumbing had been properly tied or capped off. However, in 
Conclusions of Law No.l, the trial court made the explicit 
finding that Brubaker did not waive Jex? s required performance 
under the plans and specifications. These plans and 
specifications required Jex to "verify that all work to be 
removed, electrical has been completely shut off and any piping, 
conduit, et cetera, is tied off or capped off.". (Conclusions of 
Law No.l). Jex has failed to demonstrate that Brubaker 
intentionally relinquished this contractual requirement. 
Brubakerfs superintendent did not indicate that Jex should not 
make an independent verification of whether the plumbing and 
electrical were tied off or capped off. 
Issue 2. Jex argues that Brubaker is estopped from claiming 
Damages against Jex based on Jex's reliance on Brubakerfs 
statements that the electrical and plumbing had been properly 
tied and capped off. However, Brubaker did not make any 
representations to Jex that Jex should not independently verify 
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that the electrical and plumbing had been properly tied and 
capped off. Jex merely interpreted the superintendent's 
statement as such. Moreover, Jex did not reasonably act upon the 
actual statements made by Brubaker's superintendent. Contrary to 
Jex's argument, the fact that Jex is not a licensed plumber or 
electrician does not justify his reliance on the superintendent's 
statements. 
Issue 3. Jex argues that Brubaker is not entitled to delay 
damages for those periods of delay caused by Brubaker. However, 
the trial court specifically found that delay damages were the 
result of repairs needed where Jex damaged electrical wire in a 
junction box in the demolished building and damaged conduit pipe 
and racks. (Findings of Fact No.4). In addition, Jex's refusal 
to saw-cut certain concrete extension walls added to the delay. 
(Findings of Fact No.5). Jex's mistakenly argues that the 
contract notice of delay requirement was meaningless in this 
situation since Brubaker knew of the delay. Jex fails to 
properly interpret this contract provision. 
Issue 4. Jex argues that Brubaker waived delay damages 
because Brubaker never made any claim for delay while Jex 
performed his demolition. However, Brubaker was not required to 
make such claims during the demolition period. Moreover, the 
delays were not a result of Jex's slow performance but were the 





BRUBAKER DID NOT WAIVE CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 
REQUIRING JEX TO VERIFY THAT ELECTRICAL AND 
PLUMBING LINES HAD BEEN PROPERLY TIED OFF OR CAPPED OFF. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently defined waiver as 
"the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Soter's v. 
Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935/ 939-940 (citations 
omitted.) "Waiver requires three elements: (1) an existing 
right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and 
(3) an intention to relinquish the right." Id. at 940 (citations 
omitted). "On appeal, the question frequently is whether, as a 
matter of law, intentional relinquishment was or was not 
shown...[T]his legal question is intensely fact dependent...Id. 
at 940. "[A] fact finder should assess the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the relinquishment is clearly 
intended". Id. at 941. "To mount a successful attack upon the 
correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & 
Gas Co.. 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). 
Jex fails to demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding that Brubaker did not waive 
any rights. In addition, Jex has not shown that Brubaker 
intentionally relinquished its rights. The trial court made the 
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explicit finding based on the totality of the facts presented at 
trial that Brubaker did not waive Jex's required performance 
under the plans and specifications. These plans and 
specifications required Jex to "verify that wor 1 c tic: be 
removed, electrical has been completely shut off and any piping, 
conduit, et cetera, is tied off or capped off.". (Conclusion of 
Law No.1). 
Jex's appellate brief indicates that Issue 1 is a legal 
question and therefore, the Court should give no deference to the 
conclusions of the court below. (Brief of Ap|icl 1 ai i t, Page 1). 
However, Jex is actually challenging the trial court's findings 
of fact as to whether Brubaker waived any rights and therefore, 
the Court should disregard the label gi vei I to 1: he fi nd and 
look to the substance of the finding. State v. Rio Vista Oil, 
Ltd.. 786 p.2d 1343 (Utah 1990). Jex argues that Brubakerfs 
superintendent indicatec he need not i ndependently 
verify the electrical and plumbing systems. The meaning of the 
superintendent's statement is a factual question yet Jex has 
failed to marshal all the. evidence in suppoi t of I IK « trial 
court's finding that there was no waiver, and demonstrate that 
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing i t: :;i i: i a 1 i ght most favorable to the court below. 
Although Jex argues that Brubaker, through its 
superintendent, allegedly told Jex that the plumbing and 
electrical t lad been lied oil ox capped of, Brubakerfs 
superintendent merely indicated that "everything was taken care 
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of.M (Trial Transcript, p.73, lines 3 through p.74, line 8). The 
trial court determined this statement was not a waiver of Jex's 
contractual obligation to verify these facts before beginning his 
demolition work. Brubaker did not intentionally relinquish Jex's 
contractual requirement to make an independent verification that 
the electrical and plumbing were shut off and capped off. 
Contrary to Jex's assertion in his brief, Brubaker's 
superintendent did not indicate that Jex should not make an 
independent verification. Nor did the superintendent assert that 
the building was ready to knock down. Jex merely interpreted the 
superintendent's statement that "everything was taken care of" to 
mean that "everything was capped off, ready to knock down." 
(Trial Transcript, p.74, lines 6-16.) However, the 
superintendent did not make such a statement. 
Therefore, Jex's appellate brief fails to show that there 
was an "intentional relinquishment" of Brubaker's contractual 
right that Jex verify independently that the plumbing and 
electrical were tied off. 
Jex argues that this case is similar to B.R. Woodward 
Marketing v. Collins Food. 754 P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988). 
However, that case has little similarity to the matter here. 
B.R. Woodward involved the waiver of an employee's right to claim 
compensation where the employee failed to request the 
compensation until after termination. Here, Jex alleges the 
statement by Brubaker's superintendent was the relinquishment of 
Jex's requirement to make an independent investigation of whether 
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the electrical ai id pJ i imbii ig wer e ti ed off &.&.Woodward concerns 
a party's failure to act. Woodward failed to say anything about 
being compensated until after his termination. 754 p.2d at 100. 
The matter <it hand involves an alleged affirmative voluntary • 
statement of relinquishment by Brubaker. However, Brubaker never 
relinquished the requirement that Jex make an independent 
invpstigation, Rmbaker's superintendent may have indicated that 
Jex could proceed with his work after the asbestos problem was 
solved, but Brubaker never said Jex should not make an 
independent verification of the status of the plumbing and 
electrical, Jex wrongly interpreted the superintendentf s 
statement as such. But as the trial court found, the statements 
made by 1! -••• fs superintendent did not waive the contract 
requirement . Conclusions of Law No, J ) Therefor e, tl :i I s Coi lr t 
should uphold the trial court finding that Brubaker's 
superintendent' s statements to Jex were insufficient to waive or 
limit Jex's required performance pursuant to the plans and 
specifications. 
' ' POINT III 
BRUBAKER IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING DAMAGES 
AGAINST JEX FOR DAMAGING ELECTRICAL LINES. 
In o r d e r t o i nvoke tin* cioctiiric* uf e s tuppe .1 , " t h e t o s t is 
whether there is conduct, by act or omission, by which one party 
knowingly leads another party, reasonably acting thereon, to take 
some course of action, which will resuJ t I i I 1 li s detriment o r 
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate or deny his 
conduct or representation. u.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney 
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Company, Inc.. 534 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1975). 
Here, Jex claims that Brubaker is estopped from repudiating 
its representations in obtaining damages. (Brief of Appellant, 
page 13) Jex uses several cases to support his argument. 
However, these cases are different from the matter at hand 
because the cases all involve a party's attempt to renege on 
specific unambiguous representations or contractual agreements. 
Here, Jex attempts to estop Brubaker from collecting damages 
based on Jex's misinterpretation of statements made by Brubaker's 
superintendent. However, Brubaker did not knowingly make any 
representations to Jex and Jex did not reasonably act upon the 
statements made by Brubaker's superintendent. 
Brubaker's superintendent told Jex that "everything is taken 
care of". (Trial transcript, p.74, line 6). Jex understood that 
statement to mean that "the plumbing was capped off, which it 
was." (Trial transcript, p.74, line 8). Brubaker's 
superintendent did not knowingly tell or infer to Jex that Jex 
was relieved of his contractual duty to independently verify that 
the plumbing and electrical were capped off or tied off. 
Brubaker never said to Jex that Jex could start demolition 
without making an independent verification. Jex misinterpreted 
the statement to mean that he could begin to knock down the 
building. (Trial transcript, p.74, line 17-18). Jex failed to 
make an independent investigation of the plumbing and electrical 
systems. As a result, as the lower court found, Brubaker was 
required to perform repairs to damages electrical wires in a 
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junction box in the demolished building, damaged conduit pipp aiul 
racks, which were not properly capped or tied off pursuant to the 
plans and specification. (Findings of Fact No.4). 
Jex also asserts t! lat because 1: le was no I: a pi umber or 
electrician, he needed to rely upon Brubakerfs representative, 
(Brief of Appellant, page 13). This assertion has no merit. The 
fact that Jex is not a plumber ot electrician is irrelevant. If 
no statement had been made by Brubakerf s superintendent to Jex, 
Jex would still have been required to make an independent 
verification of f ho | > 1 iimb i nq timl electrical systems, even if Jex 
were not a plumber or electrician. The fact that Brubaker's 
superintendent made a statement to Jex did not alter Jex's 
contractutil requi remon! to make the investigation. Jex could-" 
have hired an electrician or plumber to verify that the systems 
were capped or tied off. 
POINT ix. 
BRUBAKER IS ENTITLED TO DELAY DAMAGES AGAINST 
JEX AS A RESULT OF NEEDED REPAIRS TO DAMAGED 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM AND JEX'S REFUSAL TO SAW-CUT 
CONCRETE EXTENSION WALLS. 
In the Findings of Fact, the trial court found that the 
delays were a re.suit of needed repairs to damaged electrical wire 
in a junction box in the demolished building and damaged conduit 
pipe and racks. (Findings of Fact No.4). In addition, Jex's 
refusal to saw-cut certai11 concrete extension walls added to the 
delay. (Findings of Fact No.5). Brubaker, as a result of tilese 
delays suffered damages. (Findings of Fact No.8). Even if Hex 
claimed he was not allowed start due to asbestos removal, this 
13 
assertion was insufficient to waive or limit his required 
performance pursuant to the plans and specifications because he 
notified no one pursuant to the plans and specifications. 
(Conclusions of Law, No.2). 
Jex argues that Brubaker is not entitled to delay damages 
because: (1) Jex was not able to start work until June 19, a ten-
day delay, and notification of the delay (as required by the 
contract) to Brubaker would have been meaningless since Brubaker 
was aware of the delay; and (2) the delays were the result of 
needed repairs to the electrical system which might be 
attributable to Brubaker. However, Jex has failed to adequately 
support his arguments and his arguments are contrary to the 
findings and conclusions of the trial court. 
Jex's assertion that notification of the delay to Brubaker 
would have been meaningless misinterprets the purpose of the 
contract requirement. Under plans and specifications, page 4, 
section 2200, Jex was required to "refer to the general 
contractor any conditions detrimental to proper and timely 
completion of the work." (Conclusions of Law No.2). The purpose 
of this section is to make the general contractor aware of 
conditions which will affect job completion. The fact that 
Brubaker knew of the asbestos problem does not make section 2200 
"meaningless". Brubaker would need to know from Jex, how, if at 
all, the delay in starting demolition would impact Jex's 
completion date. Jex may have included contingencies in his 
schedule to account for such delays. Brubaker would be unaware 
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of such contingencies unless Jrx made him aw.ue of ihem. The :'"v 
asbestos problem may or may not have had any effect upon Jex's 
completion date. Therefore, the contractual provision relied 
upo: ..airing notice should apply even if 
Brubaker had actual knowledge of the delay. The provision is not 
"meaningless" as Jex contends. 
Jex ci tes several cases to si lpport his argument that 
Brubaker is not entitled to delay damages. However, the holdings 
of these cases do not apply to the matter at hand. In Hiqqins v. 
City of Fillmore, f in x^oi), the Court held that 
one who causes a delay or contributes thereto may be precluded 
from recovering damages. In Hiqqins, the Court found that the 
City caused - '• delays and therefore, the City was not entitled •• 
to withhold liquidated damages. Id. at 1 94, More, on the other 
hand, there was no finding by the trial court that Brubaker 
causer! any dpl.fi>,, 1.. Irjr.l, Hie trial court held that Jex caused 
delays. (Findings of Fact, No. 4 and 5). Therefore, Hiqqins 
does not apply here. 
Jex al so c a tes Western Engineers, Inc. v. State Road 
Commission, 20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d ?16 (1968) where the Court 
held that a "no damages" provision in construction contracts 
would 1,H" precluded if the delay is the result of fraud or active 
interference on the part of one seekinq the benefit of the 
provision. 437 P.2d at 217. Here, the trial Court did not find 
nor has Jex provided any evidence of "fraud" or "active 
interference" by Brubaker. Jex merely claims that Brubakei: 
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caused the delay, although the trial court made no such finding 
or conclusion. Therefore, Western Engineers does not apply here. 
Jex also cites Wevher Construction Co. v. Cox Construction 
Co., 22 Utah 2d 365, 453 P.2d 161 (1969), where the Supreme Court 
sustained a jury verdict in favor of a subcontractor for damages. 
However, in Wevher. the subcontractor provided notice to the 
other party about the costs of delay. Id. at 163. Here, Jex 
provided no notice. He claims notice would have been 
meaningless. In Wevher. the Court also held that Cox had made it 
impossible for Weyher to perform on time. Here, the trial Court 
did not find that Brubaker made it impossible for Jex to perform 
on time. Jex also has failed to provide any evidence of such in 
his brief. Therefore, this Court should uphold the delay damages 
found by the trial court. 
POINT IV. 
BRUBAKER DID NOT WAIVE DELAY DAMAGES 
THROUGH ITS COURSE OF DEALING WITH JEX. 
In the Fourth Argument of his appellate brief, Jex argues 
that Brubaker waived delay damages through its course of dealing 
with Jex. Yet, contrary to Jex's argument, the trial court found 
that Jex caused delays to the project. (Findings of Fact No. 4 
and 5). As a result of these delays, Brubaker suffered damages. 
(Findings of Fact No.8). Jex indicates in his brief that the 
issue of whether Brubaker had waived delay damages by its course 
of dealing is a legal question. (Brief of Appellant, p.3) 
However, Jex is merely making arguments based on the facts 
presented at trial. Therefore, Jex must marshal all relevant 
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evidence presented a t ti: i a] that tei ids to si lppor t tl le findings 
and demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous. West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct.App. 
1991). Y *11 .1 o ,H I J .-j h I i n I c (1 in in a r s 1\ a 1 a 1 1 r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e 
presented at trial that tends to support the findings and 
demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous. Rather, Jex 
1 las made vari ous cites fi: on it. t l le ti:i al transcript to support his 
argument without showing that the trial court's findings of fact 
listed above are erroneous. 
Jex indicates that Brubaker did not take any steps to 
expedite work or make any demands upon Jex as provided for in the 
Project Manual. (Trial transcript, p.75, line 18 through p.76, 
line 1 0) However, the contract does not require Brubaker to 
make such a demand but allows for such demand. 
Jex also indicates that Brubaker required an area be cleared 
within 30 days, which was accomplished by Jex. (Trial transcript, 
p. 79, line 22 through p.80, line 1) However, the delay damages 
were not based on clearing any area. Brubakerfs claim damages 
were a result of needed repairs to damaged electrical wires and 
conduit pipe and racks, as well as Jex's refusal to saw-ci11 
certain concrete extension walls. 
In addition, Jex indicates that during his prosecution of 
the work, no one from Brubaker I old him fbai fie was causing 
delays in the job or was preventing subcontractors from getting 
on the job. (Trial transcript, p.80, line 24 through p.81, line 
6). Again, Brubaker's claim damages were a result of needed 
17 
repairs to damaged electrical wires and conduit pipe and racks, 
as well as Jex's refusal to saw-cut certain concrete extension 
walls. The delay damages were not based on delaying others on 
the job but rather on creating extra work to be completed. 
Finally, Jex indicates that Brubaker made payments to Jex 
and prepared change orders which did not include any claims for 
delay damages. (Trial transcript, p.87, line 10 through p.88, 
line 17; p.89, line 12 through p.90). However, the fact that 
Brubaker did not claim any delay damages when making payments to 
Jex is not a waiver of the delay damages which Brubaker was 
awarded. Waiver is "the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right." Soter's v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 
939-940 (citations omitted). None of Jex's supporting evidence 
indicates that Brubaker made an intentional relinquishment of his 
right to claim delay damages because of the needed repairs to the 
electrical items that Jex damaged and Jex's refusal to saw-cut 
certain concrete extension walls. All the evidence presented by 
Jex concerns delays in Jex's performance, not the delays for 
which Brubaker was awarded damages by the trial court. 
Jex has failed to marshall all relevant evidence presented 
at trial that tends to support the findings and demonstrate why 
the findings are clearly erroneous. Jex's argument does not deal 
with the delay damages awarded by the trial court. Therefore, 
Jex has failed to show that Brubaker waived the claims for delay 
damages which were awarded by the trial court. The trial court's 
findings and conclusions should therefore, be upheld. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court made the explicit finding that Brubaker did 
not waive the contract requirement that Jex verify that all 
electrical and plumbing be tied off or capped off. Brubakerfs 
superintendent did not indicate that Jex should not make such an 
independent verification. Jex merely misinterpreted the 
superintendent's statement. The fact that Jex is not a licensed 
plumber or electrician did not justify his failure to make such 
an independent investigation. 
Jex argues that Brubaker waived the contractual verification 
requirement. However, waiver requires a showing that a party 
intentionally relinquished a right, and Jex has failed to show 
that Brubaker intentionally relinquished the contractual 
requirement to independently verify the status of the electrical 
and plumbing system. 
Jex claims that Brubaker was responsible for Jex's delay in 
starting the project and therefore, Brubaker is not entitled to 
certain delay damages. Jex also claims that Brubaker never made 
any claims that Jex was delaying the project. However, the 
delay damages awarded to Brubaker were the result of repairs 
required to electric work which Jex damaged, and the result of 
Jex refusing to perform certain work. They were not related to 





Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial 
courtf s j udgment. _ / 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this {"* day of July, 1996. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
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ADDENDUM 
Steven D. Crawley (0750) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
57 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-7000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUBAKER CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





CNA SURETY CLAIMS, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on October 24, 1995 sitting without 
a jury. Steven D. Crawley appeared for Plaintiff and Wayne H. 
Braunberger appeared for Defendant. The Third-Party Defendant, CNA 
Surety Claims, was never served with process in this matter and did 
not appear. 
The Court having received exhibits, heard testimony and 
nLSDWS7WCTS(?HnT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 7 1995 
*_JE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT 
aao43nq 
Civil No.: 940906516CN 
Judge Frederick 
defendant's refusal to saw-cut certain concrete extension walls 
added to the delay. 
6. The electrical damage and repairs were paid for by the 
school district initially and then deducted from the plaintiff's 
contract, and the charges that were rendered for that service were 
reasonable and necessarily incurred. (See Exhibits 6 & 7). And 
those repairs totaled $50,598.00. 
7. Defendant acknowledges that the job was not complete 
until around the 26th of August, some 60 days past schedule, even 
then not including the electrical repairs that had yet to be 
finished. 
8. The plaintiff, as a result of these delays, suffered 
damages. (See Exhibits 6 and 7). There has been no contrafy 
evidence regarding the plaintiff's losses. This Court therefore, 
accepts the plaintiff's proffer that its losses as itemized on 
Exhibit 6 are indeed accurate and were necessarily incurred as a 
result of the delays occasioned by the defendant's conduct. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant does not deny damage to the electrical 
system, but he claims that his demolition began only after 
plaintiff's on-site superintendent told him "everything is taken 
care of". Even if true, this assurance is insufficient to waive or 
limit defendant's required performance pursuant to the plans and 
3 
5. The defendant's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint 
should be dismissed, no cause of action. 
JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant in 
the principal amount of $88,950.00; 
2. That the judgment shall be augmented by the amount of 
attorneys fees that the above-entitled Court shall deem reasonable 
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration; 
3. That the judgment shall bear interest at the highest 
legal rate from and after entry until paid in full; 
4. That the Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint are 
dismissed with prejudice. 1 
Hi DATED t h i s 'J '>fey Of 
» 
ML , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of 1995, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
c~>siH> oocuMEvrr or. F ,*.- -**_ 
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